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Holding on to Fundamental Rights is No Walk in the Park:
Challenging the Constitutionality of the Park Ban Upheld in
Standley v. Town of Woodfin*
INTRODUCTION

Imagine the perfect day when the sun is shining, the air is cool
and clear, and the only plans for the day involve walking through

town to attend a cookout with friends in the middle of the public
park. Or maybe picture the day of the town's long-awaited baseball
tournament, when all town citizens are welcome to travel into the
park and enjoy the open spaces and atmosphere with fellow residents.
These experiences involve activities most people enjoy doing, yet
nevertheless take for granted. But for some residents of the town of
Woodfin, North Carolina, imagining the events described above is as
close as they may come to the actual experiences.' For those
residents, the "doors" to the parks have been closed, and the "Keep
Out" signs have been duly posted.2 And for those residents, this may
only be the first step toward further exclusion from public gathering
places and perhaps from society at large.
In 2005, the town of Woodfin, North Carolina, enacted an
ordinance that banned a broad group of residents-anyone on a sex
offender registry-from entering any of the town's public parks.' The
professed purpose of the ordinance was to protect the children of
Woodfin from sexual predators.4 The ordinance was enacted very
shortly after two incidents, both of which involved sexual offenses,
occurred in close proximity to Woodfin parks.5 The effects of this
ordinance were of particular concern to Woodfin resident David
Standley, who found himself among those banned from entering the
* Copyright © 2009 by Emily E. Reardon.
1. WOODFIN, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCE § 130.03 (2005) (making it an offense for
anyone on a sex offender registry, whether in North Carolina "or any other state or
federal agency," to enter any one of the town's public parks).
2. Id. ("The Town Administrator shall be charged with posting this regulation at the
main entrance of each park within thirty (30) days of the passage of this ordinance.").
3. Id.
4. Record of Appeal at 227-29, Standley v. Town of Woodfin (Standley 1), 186 N.C.
App. 134, 650 S.E.2d 618 (2007) (No. 06-1449) (showing the transcript of the Town
Minutes for April 19, 2005, in which town attorney Joseph Ferikes discussed with others
that the ultimate purpose of the ordinance was "to protect children" in the town parks).
5. Standley v. Town of Woodfin (Standley I), 362 N.C. 328, 330, 661 S.E.2d 728, 729
(2008) (summarizing the events that led to the town passing its ordinance).
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town parks because his name was on a sex offender registry.6 Mr.
Standley, who suffers from the crippling effects of a stroke that left
him wheelchair-bound and unable to "travel[] without being7
accompanied by his mother or some other adult who can assist him,"
frequented a particular town park with his mother prior to the
enactment of the ordinance.8 Considering his state of immobility, his
constant supervision while in the parks,9 and his lack of any history
involving the commission of crimes against children,' ° Mr. Standley
seems like an improbable candidate to commit the crimes that the
town seeks to prevent. 1 Nevertheless, he and others like him fall
within the reach of the ordinance's ban.
Can a town constitutionally revoke residents' rights to
innocently12 access and experience parts of the public community by
excluding an entire group of people from public parks? The Supreme
Court of North Carolina answered that question affirmatively when it
decided Standley v. Town of Woodfin. 3 In Standley, a unanimous
court upheld the constitutionality of a local ordinance that bans all
registered sex offenders in the town of Woodfin, North Carolina,
6. David Standley was twenty-three years old when, in 1987, he "was convicted in
Florida of attempted sexual battery and aggravated assault against an adult woman."
Brief of Appellant-Petitioner at 3-4, Standley 1, 186 N.C. App. 134, 650 S.E.2d 618 (No.
06-1449). Mr. Standley was granted an unconditional release from prison in 1999 and
subsequently moved to North Carolina with his mother. Id. at 4. Due to his prior
convictions, Mr. Standley was required by statute to promptly register with the North
Carolina Sex Offender Registry when he moved to North Carolina, which he did in a
timely manner. Id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.7 (2007) ("If the person [with a
prior conviction for a sexual offense] moves to North Carolina from outside this State, the
person shall register within 10 days of establishing residence in this State, or whenever the
person has been present in the State for 15 days, whichever comes first."), amended by
2008 N.C. Sess. Laws 117 (to be codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.7) (narrowing the time
period for registration from ten days to three business days).
7. Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supranote 6, at 5.
8. See id. (explaining that the particular park chosen by Mr. Standley and his mother
was close to their home and was "handicapped-friendly" to accommodate Mr. Standley's
disability).
9. Id. ("While visiting the Park prior to the passage of the Ordinance, [Mr. Standley]
was always accompanied by his mother.").
10. Id. at 4 ("[Mr. Standley] has never been charged nor convicted of any criminal act
involving a child.").
11. See id. at 6 ("There has never been any allegation that [Mr. Standley] ever
engaged in any type of inappropriate conduct with anyone, including any child, while
visiting the Park. Further, there has never been any allegation that [Mr. Standley] ever
engaged in any type of inappropriate conduct with anyone, including any child, while
living within the Town of Woodfin.") (internal citations omitted).
12. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999) ("[A]s the United States
recognizes, the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the 'liberty' protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
13. Standley v. Town of Woodfin (Standley I1), 362 N.C. 328,661 S.E.2d 728 (2008).
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from entering any of the town's public parks.' 4 In so holding, the
court reasoned that the "asserted liberty interest to freely roam in
parks owned, operated, or maintained by Woodfin" is not a
fundamental right, and therefore, the ordinance only needs to, and
does, pass constitutional muster under the rational basis test. 5 In
opposition to the Supreme Court of North Carolina's holding, this
Recent Development contends that the Woodfin ordinance
implicates the fundamental right to intrastate travel, and therefore,
the court should have applied a strict scrutiny analysis to determine
the constitutionality of the ordinance. This Recent Development
argues further that the continued enactment and judicial approval of
legislation like the ordinance in Woodfin seriously threatens
constitutional protections for everyone.
Part I of this Recent Development argues that the Supreme
Court of North Carolina's use of the rational basis test was improper
in Standley because: (a) a fundamental right to intrastate travel exists
in North Carolina, and ordinances barring access to public parks, such
as the Woodfin ordinance, do infringe this right; and (b) the strict
scrutiny analysis applies whenever such a fundamental right is
infringed. After concluding that a strict scrutiny analysis was proper
in this case, Part II of this Recent Development argues that the court
should have found that the ordinance failed strict scrutiny for lack of
a narrowly tailored application, both in terms of who and what may
be banned. Finally, Part III of this Recent Development explores the
implications of courts upholding legislation that violates fundamental
rights,16 arguably in the name of public safety, and how such holdings
may gradually erode the constitutional rights of all citizens.
I. THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST IS IMPROPER FOR A FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT

In the United States, a distinction is drawn between fundamental
and non-fundamental rights. 7 When state legislation implicates a
14. Id. at 329, 661 S.E.2d at 729.
15. Id. at 331-33, 661 S.E.2d at 730-32 (finding that Woodfin's ordinance was
rationally related to protecting park visitors from sexual attacks which was a legitimate
government interest).
16. See, e.g., Bret R. Hobson, Note, Banishing Acts: How Far May States Go to Keep
Convicted Sex Offenders Away From Children?, 40 GA. L. REV. 961, 966 (2006)
(explaining that sex offenders are forced to rely on the courts "for protection from
restrictions that go too far").
17. 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1118 (2005) (noting fundamental rights that are
subject to strict scrutiny include, for example, voting, marriage, and travel, whereas nonfundamental rights include, for example, education, discharge of bankruptcy, and
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fundamental right, courts must analyze such legislation using a higher
degree of scrutiny 8 than would be used for a non-fundamental right. 9
This more exacting scrutiny is meant to provide "heightened
protection against government interference"2 for those rights that the
Constitution expressly or implicitly protects.2'
A.

The FundamentalRight to Intrastate Travel and the Infringing
Nature of the Park Ban

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there
exists a fundamental right to interstate travel.22 The Supreme Court
of North Carolina, in turn, has recognized a fundamental right to
intrastate travel, noting in State v. Dobbins23 that "the right to travel
upon the public streets of a city is a part of every individual's liberty,
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and by the Law of the Land Clause,
Article I, § 17, of the Constitution of North Carolina. '24 Seemingly,
this recognized right to intrastate travel would be a controlling factor
in a case involving access to public parks, but the Standley court failed
to adopt this rationale.
In the absence of North Carolina case law fully interpreting the
bounds of the fundamental right to intrastate travel, the court in
Standley turned to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis in
employment).
18. See Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 2002 FED App. 0332P, 31, 310 F.3d 484, 504
(6th Cir.) ("We, of course, do not demand of legislatures scientifically certain criteria of
legislation. But when constitutional rights are at issue, strict scrutiny requires legislative
clarity and evidence demonstrating the ineffectiveness of proposed alternatives.")
(internal citations omitted).
19. Standley 11, 362 N.C. at 332, 661 S.E.2d at 731 (" 'When determining whether a
rational basis exists for application of a law, we must determine whether the law in
question is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.' " (quoting In re R.L.C.,
361 N.C. 287, 295, 643 S.E.2d 920, 924 (2007) (plurality))).
20. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
21. See 16B AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 816 (1998).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) ("The constitutional
right to travel from one State to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the
concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly
recognized."); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) ("[Tlhe right is so important
that it is 'assertable against private interference as well as governmental action ... a
virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all.' " (quoting
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring))).
23. 277 N.C. 484, 178 S.E.2d 449 (1971).
24. Id. at 497, 178 S.E.2d at 456; see also Standley H, 362 N.C. at 331, 661 S.E.2d at 730
(describing the Supreme Court of North Carolina's recognition of a fundamental right to
intrastate travel as a "corollary" to the United States Supreme Court's recognition of a
fundamental right to interstate travel).
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Johnson v. City of Cincinnati.' Drawing from Johnson, the Standley
court characterized the right to intrastate travel as one of function, as
opposed to one of access: it is" 'an everyday right, a right we depend
on to carry out our daily life activities.' "26 As such, the court found
that Mr. Standley's right to access and use the parks27 was not part of
those rights necessary to "carry out" a person's daily life.2" Using this
characterization, the court concluded that Mr. Standley's liberty
interest involving access to and use of the parks was "not
encapsulated by the right to intrastate travel."29 However, taking a
closer look at the analysis in Johnson exposes a problem with the
Standley court's characterization of the right to intrastate travel,
which, once resolved, reveals that Mr. Standley's liberty interest in
the parks does fall within the scope of the right to intrastate travel.
The Standley court's decision hinges on its interpretation of
Johnson to mean that the right to intrastate travel is only one of
function.30 However, the Standley court overlooked the fact that the
court in Johnson specifically stated that the "right to intrastate
travel[,] ...the right to travel locally through public spaces and
roadways-is fundamentally one of access."31 The Johnson court
ultimately found that an ordinance banning an entire group of people
who had criminal pasts involving drugs from accessing the public
spaces in a certain area of town did in fact violate their rights to
intrastate travel.32 The parks in Woodfin, while perhaps not literally
"public streets" as discussed in Dobbins,33 "are ...frequently the
25. 2002 FED App. 0332P, 310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir.).
26. Standley 11, 362 N.C. at 331, 661 S.E.2d at 730 (quoting Johnson, 2002 FED App
20, 310 F.3d at 498).
27. The court defined Mr. Standley's liberty interest as one including the right "to

enter into Woodfin Riverside Park to have barbecues and enjoy[] the leisure offered by
nature along the riverbank." Id. (alteration in original).
28. Id.

29. Id.
30. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
31. Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 2002 FED App. 0332P, 16, 310 F.3d 484, 495 (6th
Cir.) (emphasis added).
32. Id. 29, 310 F.3d at 503. The facts of Johnson are analogous to the facts of
Standley. The city of Cincinnati instituted an ordinance to "enhance the quality of life and
protect the health, safety, and welfare of persons in neighborhoods ...associated with
drug abuse." Id. 2, 310 F.3d at 487. The ordinance created "drug-exclusion zones,"
which banned from public spaces anyone who had committed a drug-related offense
within the zones. Id. 3, 310 F.3d at 487. Plaintiffs, who were in the group of those
banned from the designated public spaces, argued that the ordinance "violate[d] their
asserted right to freedom of movement and intrastate travel." Id. 12, 310 F.3d at 493.
33. State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C. 484, 499, 178 S.E.2d 449, 457-58 (1971); see also
Standley 11, 362 N.C. at 331, 661 S.E.2d at 730 (citing Dobbins for the reference to "public
streets").
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heart of our communities and cannot reasonably be separated from
other walkways." 34 Furthermore, such public parks are open spaces
as contemplated by the Johnson court.35 Therefore, a bar to the
access of a public space, such as a park, regardless of whether the
activity done during the course of that access is necessary to one's
daily life,36 would infringe the fundamental right to intrastate travel.37
If we view the right at issue as one of access, rather than one of pure
function, then the activities in which Mr. Standley chooses to take
part while at the park do not determine whether the right to intrastate
travel is being invoked. Rather, the issue turns strictly on the fact
that Mr. Standley has been denied all access to a public space.38
Because the Woodfin ordinance does in fact bar access to the town's
public parks for anyone on a sex offender registry,3 9 the ordinance
infringes the fundamental right to intrastate travel.
B.

The Level of Scrutiny Requiredfor FundamentalRights

Generally, "where a fundamental liberty interest protected by
the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth
Amendment is involved, the government cannot infringe on that right
'unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.' "40 Finding the "right to travel on the public streets...
a fundamental segment of liberty,' 41 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, in both Dobbins and Standley, recognized that an "absolute
34. Standley v. Town of Woodfin (Standley 1), 186 N.C. App. 134, 157,650 S.E.2d 618,
633 (2007) (Geer, J., dissenting).
35. Johnson, 2002 FED App.

19, 310 F.3d at 497. "[I]t is apparent that an

individual's decision to remain in a public place of his choice is as much a part of his liberty
as the freedom of movement inside frontiers that is 'a part of our heritage.' "Id. (emphasis
added) (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958)).
36. See Standley 11, 362 N.C. at 331, 661 S.E.2d at 730 (discussing the view that
activities such as barbecues and other leisure events are outside the scope of those things
functionally required for everyday life).
37. See Johnson, 2002 FED App. J 16, 310 F.3d at 495 ("[T]he right to intrastate
travel ... is fundamentally one of access.").
38. Id.
39. See WOODFIN, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCE § 130.03 (2005). The Woodfin

ordinance "shall" make it a criminal offense for any person on the sex offender registry to
"enter" any of the public parks, thus unconditionally barring access to a public space. See
id. Therefore, at the moment someone who falls within the prohibition of the statute
enters the park, even if only to pass through to get to another part of town, a crime has
been committed, and the state can take the requisite action against that person. See id.
The key element to examine in an analysis of the statute is entrance into the park. See id.
No other action by the person in question need be taken. See id.
40. Johnson, 2002 FED App. 1 27, 310 F.3d at 502 (quoting Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). This is known as the "strict scrutiny" test.
41. State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C. 484,499, 178 S.E.2d 449,457-58 (1971).
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prohibition 'requires substantially more justification' than would
otherwise be required for state action."4 The Woodfin ordinance at
issue "is an 'absolute prohibition' against registered sex offenders
traveling into town parks"43 because it provides for no exceptions in
any regard." Therefore, since the court has specifically recognized
the need for a heightened level of scrutiny when dealing with the
infringement of such a fundamental right4 5 and the Woodfin
ordinance, as an absolute prohibition to accessing parks, violates the
fundamental right to intrastate travel,46 the court should have applied
strict scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of the Woodfin
ordinance.
II. STRICT SCRUTINY ANALYSIS OF THE WOODFIN PARK BAN

As discussed above, the strict scrutiny analysis requires
examining the state action to determine whether a compelling state
interest exists and whether the state action has been narrowly tailored
to meet that interest. To analyze whether an ordinance has been

42. Standley v. Town of Woodfin (Standley 11), 362 N.C. 328, 331, 661 S.E.2d 728, 730
(2008) (quoting Dobbins, 277 N.C. at 499, 178 S.E.2d at 458); see also State v. Burnett, 755
N.E.2d 857, 865-66 (Ohio 2001) ("Any deprivation of the right to travel ...must be
evaluated under a compelling-interest test.").
43. Standley v. Town of Woodfin (Standley 1), 186 N.C. App. 134, 159, 650 S.E.2d 618,
634 (2007) (Geer, J., dissenting).
44. See Dobbins, 277 N.C. at 497, 178 S.E.2d at 456 (finding a distinction between
absolute prohibition and "regulat[ion], as to the time and manner of its exercise"); see also
infra Part II.B (discussing the types of exceptions that may be more conducive to narrow
tailoring).
45. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
46. Dobbins, 277 N.C. at 497, 178 S.E.2d at 456 ("[Tjhe right to travel upon the public
streets of a city is a part of every individual's liberty, protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by the Law of the
Land Clause, Article I, § 17, of the Constitution of North Carolina.").
47. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. The argument in this Recent
Development is not focused on whether a compelling state interest exists, for "[t]he
'legitimate and compelling state interest' in protecting the community from crime cannot
be doubted." Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) (quoting De Veau v. Braisted, 363
U.S. 144, 155 (1960)). Rather, the argument is that even if a compelling state interest were
to exist, thereby satisfying the first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis, the Woodfin
ordinance would still fail the second prong of the analysis because the language and
application of the ordinance are not narrowly tailored. Mr. Standley conceded that the
interest promoted by Woodfin of protecting children in the town's parks is a compelling
interest, but he argued that the ordinance was "not narrowly tailored to serve that
interest." Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 6, at 10; see also Standley 1, 186 N.C.
App. at 159, 650 S.E.2d at 635 (Geer, J., dissenting) ("Mr. Standley does not dispute that
the Town has a compelling interest ....The question ... is whether the record establishes

that the ordinance is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The record ... contains no
evidence at all supporting this second prong.").
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narrowly tailored, a court must identify what the stated government
interest or purpose is in enacting the ordinance (the "ends"), and the
court must identify the methods (the "means") by which the
government seeks to achieve its purpose. 8 For instance, the stated
government interest in enacting the Woodfin ordinance was to
protect children from being victimized by sexual predators. 49 The

means chosen to achieve this government interest were to exclude
registered sex offenders from town parks.5°
Once a court has identified the government's ends and its means,
the court must evaluate the effectiveness and the efficiency of the
Realistically, no law can be
means in addressing the ends."
completely effective in addressing its stated ends, and a failure to do
so does not automatically render it unconstitutional. Under a strict
scrutiny analysis, however, a court may still consider whether the law
actually does what it purports to do. 2 Lack of effectiveness indicates
a weak connection between the ends sought and the means used53
and, accordingly, is indicative of a failure to narrowly tailor.54

Even if the means are effective in addressing the ends, strict
scrutiny analysis also requires a court to analyze how efficiently the
law addresses the ends.55 If a law unnecessarily " 'encroaches on a
48. See, e.g., Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[Tlhere
must be a sufficient nexus between the stated government interest and the classification
created by the ordinance." (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982))).
49. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
50. WOODFIN, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCE § 130.03 (2005) ("It shall constitute a
general offense ... for any person ... registered as a sex offender with the state of North

Carolina and or any other state or federal agency to knowingly enter into or on any public
park owned, operated, or maintained by the Town of Woodfin.").
51. The overall level of effectiveness and efficiency is frequently referred to by courts
as the "nexus." See, e.g., Nunez, 114 F.3d at 946 ("[T]here must be a sufficient nexus
between the stated government interest and the classification created by the ordinance."
(citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982))). While courts vary in their usage of the
phrases "sufficient nexus" and "narrowly tailored," both terms represent the same
methodology under a strict scrutiny analysis.
52. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
547 (1993) ("It is established in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence that a law cannot be
regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order.., when it leaves appreciable
damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.") (internal citations omitted).
53. A law with such an effect is said to be "underinclusive." See, e.g., id. at 543
("Respondent claims that [the] Ordinances ... advance two interests: protecting the
public health and preventing cruelty to animals. The ordinances are underinclusive for
those ends.").
54. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
55. A law that collaterally prohibits, or otherwise affects, certain conduct because its
means are too broad is said to be "overinclusive." See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, 508 U.S. at 578 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("A State may no more create an
underinclusive statute, one that fails truly to promote its purported compelling interest,
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substantial amount of innocent conduct' "56 and the conduct being
encroached upon is connected with a fundamental right, strict
scrutiny analysis requires a court to strike the law down as
unconstitutional.57 To demonstrate the law's constitutionality, then,
the government entity enacting it must assure the court that "there58
are no less restrictive means available to effectuate the desired end."
Thus, while a court frequently looks at a particular law's
underinclusive nature (its ineffectiveness) in the court's strict scrutiny
analysis, that law's overinclusive nature (its inefficiency) is
substantially more critical when a fundamental right is at stake.
By analyzing the overinclusive and underinclusive nature of a
law's means and ends relationship, a court can determine whether the
law has, in fact, been narrowly tailored. The Woodfin ordinance's
lack of narrow tailoring is evident in both respects. It extends beyond
those people associated with a prior conviction for a crime against a
child, and at the same time, it fails to include other members of
society who may pose an equal risk of committing a crime against a
child.5 9 Furthermore, the ordinance lacks any exceptions to its
implementation, thereby " 'encroach[ing] upon a substantial amount
of innocent conduct.' "60 Ultimately, by failing to sufficiently direct
the ban at the appropriate group of people and by banning an overly
broad group of activities, the means employed by the ordinance are
insufficiently connected to the ends sought.
A.

Failureto Narrowly Tailor Who is Banned

While not critical to its unconstitutionality, the Woodfin park
ban's underinclusiveness illustrates the town's complete lack of an
than it may create an overinclusive statute, one that encompasses more protected conduct
than necessary to achieve its goal.").
56. Standley v. Town of Woodfin (Standley 1), 186 N.C. App. 134,163, 650 S.E.2d 618,
637 (2007) (Geer, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 867 (Ohio
2001)).
57. See Johnson v. Cincinnati, 2002 FED App. 0332P, 29, 310 F.3d 484, 503 (6th
Cir.) (" '[I]f there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden
on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater
interference.' "(quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (alteration in
original).
58. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Pugh v. Rainwater, 557
F.2d 1189, 1195 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated on othergrounds, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978)).
59. WOODFIN, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCE § 130.03 (2005) ("It shall constitute a
general offense ... for any person ... registered as a sex offender with the state of North

Carolina and or any other state or federal agency to knowingly enter into or on any public
park owned, operated, or maintained by the Town of Woodfin.") (emphasis added).
60. Standley 1, 186 N.C. App. at 163, 650 S.E.2d at 637 (Geer, J., dissenting) (quoting
State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 867 (Ohio 2001)).
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attempt to narrowly tailor its ordinance. First, the evidence does not
support the notion that children would be substantially protected by
an ordinance banning registered sex offenders from public parks.6"
The two sexual offenses that prompted the enactment of this
legislation62 were committed by people not registered as sex
offenders;63 accordingly, the Woodfin ordinance would not have
helped to prevent those crimes.'
Furthermore, sexual crimes
committed against children more often result from a violation by a
family member or friend, rather than by a stranger.6 5 Therefore, by
not targeting other groups of people who are more likely to pose a
threat to children, the ordinance fails to provide any real protection
for those citizens it intends to protect. Citizens in towns that have
instituted park bans have raised concerns that these types of bans
may actually lull parents into a "false sense of security"6 6 about what
is necessary for the protection of their children within these banned
areas.67 Having disregarded substantial countervailing factors, the
61. See Standley 1, 186 N.C. App. at 160, 650 S.E.2d at 635 (Geer, J., dissenting)
(discussing the rates at which reported sexual assaults occur in various areas and showing
that more victimizations occur in the home rather than outside it).
62. Standley v. Town of Woodfin (Standley I1), 362 N.C. 328, 330, 661 S.E.2d 728, 729
(2008) (discussing the action taken by Woodfin town officials to research and recommend
the park ban ordinance following two offenses that "occurred in or near.., public parks").
63. Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 6, at 6.
64. See Standley 1, 186 N.C. App. at 160 n.7, 650 S.E.2d at 635 n.7 (Geer, J.,
dissenting).
65. See Sarah Lindenfeld Hall, Town Bans Man from Parks, Libraries, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 29, 2008, at 4B (quoting the executive director of the
North Carolina Coalition Against Sexual Assault, Monika Johnson-Hostler, who advised
parents that "80 percent of sex offenders know their victims"); Susan Weich, Sex Offender
ProposalIsn't What Will Keep Our Kids Safe, ST. LOuis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 24, 2008, at
C1 ("Child advocates say that children not only are more likely to be sexually abused by
someone they know, but that the abuse usually happens in their homes."); Hobson, supra
note 16, at 965 ("Although many people believe that incurable, creepy strangers stalking
children around town commit all child abuse, only a small fraction of child molestation
actually comes at the hands of strangers.").
66. Max Jack, Sex Offender Ban Passes in Landslide, WINDSOR LOCKS J. (Conn.),
Aug.
8,
2008,
available
at
http://www.zwire.com/site/index.cfm?newsid=
19900529&BRD=1651&PAG=461&dept id=12343&rfi=8; see also Hall, supra note 65
(discussing a conversation with the executive director of the North Carolina Coalition
Against Sexual Assault who noted that "bans don't mean people can let down their
guard").
67. See Jack, supra note 66 (discussing the opinion of one resident who thought that
citizens' focus should be on those people not on the sex offender registry, rather than
banning all those on the list); see also April Bethea, Mecklenburg Bans Sex Offenders from
Parks, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 6, 2008, available at
http://www.newsobserver.com/news/story/1166852.html (referencing concerns expressed
by the American Civil Liberties Union that "offenses in parks often are committed by
people who aren't on the offender registry").
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town of Woodfin's park ban lacks any sort of meaningful relationship
between its means taken and ends being sought, thereby illustrating
the ordinance's lack of narrow tailoring under the strict scrutiny
analysis.68
While the ordinance's underinclusiveness certainly detracts from
its ability to pass the strict scrutiny test, its overinclusivness is the
reason it ultimately fails this analysis. The town's ordinance bans an
overly broad categorization of people from the town parks, such that
the ordinance does not efficiently protect the Woodfin citizens. One
primary reason the town of Woodfin excluded sex offenders as a
broad category, rather than narrowing the scope, is the belief that
"sex offenders have a higher rate of recidivism and are more likely to
commit another sex offense than non-sex offenders. '69 There is,
however, conflicting evidence regarding recidivism rates of sex
offenders, with some sources stating that " 'sex offenders are
relatively unlikely to commit future sexual offenses.' "70 The Woodfin
ordinance does not consider any evidence regarding whether or not a
specific offender is likely to commit a future crime,7" thereby casting
a wide net over people who may never again commit a sexually based
crime.7" For example, Mr. Standley never committed a sexual offense
against a child,73 and due to his incapacitating injury, he is incapable
of taking any such action in the future. However, Mr. Standley falls
under the large umbrella of banned citizens. This all-encompassing
ban on sex offenders, regardless of whether their past crimes involved
children, infringes the constitutional rights of those people who, like

68. See Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[T]here must
be a sufficient nexus between the stated government interest and the classification created
by the ordinance." (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982))).
69. Standley 1, 186 N.C. App. at 159, 650 S.E.2d at 635 (Geer, J., dissenting).
70. Michael Vitiello, Punishing Sex Offenders: When Good Intentions Go Bad, 40
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 651, 677 (2008) (quoting John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through
Maiming: Chemical Castration,the Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity,
3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 570 (2006)); see also Standley 1, 186 N.C. App. at 161, 650
S.E.2d at 636 (Geer, J., dissenting) (discussing an analysis of recidivism rates for sex
offenders and non-sex offenders in the commission of future sexual offenses).
71. The ordinance's definition of "sex offender" is so broad that it leaves no room for
specific exceptions based on the individual. See WOODFIN, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCE

§ 130.03 (2005) (declaring it a crime for "any person ... registered as a sex offender" to
enter Woodfin's town parks).
72. See Standley 1, 186 N.C. App. at 161-62, 650 S.E.2d at 635-36 (Geer, J., dissenting)
(discussing the lack of evidentiary support for the Town's assertions about recidivism rates
regarding sex offenders and the ordinance's lack of effectiveness in protecting children).
73. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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Mr. Standley, have never committed a sex crime against a child and
who show no tendency to commit such crimes in the future.74
B.

Failureto Narrowly Tailor What is Banned

Another issue with regard to the Woodfin ordinance's
overinclusiveness stems from the fact that, by instituting an absolute
bar to accessing the parks, it prohibits legitimate activities that
deserve protection, thus failing to consider alternatives that would be
less restrictive on the people affected. 75 For example, the Woodfin
ordinance does not include an exception to the ban that would allow a
sex offender to enter the park to vote 76 should a town election or
town meeting be held within the borders of the park.77 Furthermore,
the ordinance prohibits protected actions "such as First Amendment
activities or assembling with the public in a park for the Town's Labor
Day festivities."" While it is true that even fundamental rights, like

74. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text. To examine an instance in which
individual characteristics of the offender involved were taken into account when a ban was
implemented, see generally Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding
a park ban constitutional when implemented against only one particular citizen who (1)
was a repeat sexual offender committing acts against children; (2) was found to have a
high rate of potential recidivism; and (3) admittedly went to the parks for the purpose of
watching children in the hopes of engaging in sexual acts with them); see also ST.
CHARLES COUNTY, MO., COUNTY CHARTER § 250.445 (2009), available at
http://www.sccmo.org/Departments/ (delineating several specific child-related sexual
offenses that would prohibit a person convicted of such an offense from entering or
loitering in a county park).
75. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
76. North Carolina law provides that "[any person convicted of a crime, whereby the
rights of citizenship are forfeited, shall have such rights automatically restored" upon
unconditional release from prison. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 13-1 (2007); see also Mosi Secret,
Denied the Vote: Thousands of North Carolina Ex-Felons Can Vote. But Nobody's Told
Them, INDY (N.C.), Nov. 1, 2006, available at http://www.indyweek.com/gyrobase/
Content?oid=oid%3A39558 (reporting that many ex-felons were unaware of their right to
vote once released from incarceration).
77. See WOODFIN, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCE § 130.03 (2005) ("Each and every
entry into the park, regardless of the time period involved shall constitute a separate
offense under this ordinance.") (emphasis added). Some towns that have similar
ordinances to that of Woodfin provide exceptions to allow for potential issues dealing with
voting or other permitted activities in public places encompassed by the ban. See, e.g., ST.
CHARLES COUNTY, MO., COUNTY CHARTER § 250.445 (stating that a sex offender
banned from a town park may request and be granted permission by the Director of Parks
and Recreation to enter the park for specific events).
78. Standley v. Town of Woodfin (Standley 1), 186 N.C. App. 134, 163, 650 S.E.2d 618,
637 (2007) (Geer, J.,dissenting). The Town of Woodfin formerly maintained an official
town Website, on which it boasted of the events hosted by the Parks and Recreation
Department in the parks and recreation facilities, including the Labor Day Picnic and the
Woodfin Christmas Festival. These public events hosted within park limits would be out
of bounds for people like Mr. Standley due to the Woodfin ordinance. The Town of
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the right to intrastate travel, are not absolute and can be subject to
regulation such as "time and manner" restrictions, 9 the Woodfin ban
is an "absolute prohibition" providing for no exceptions.8" Rather
than simply prohibiting sex offenders with child-related convictions
from coming within a predetermined distance (500 feet, for example)
of playgrounds within the parks, the ordinance instead bans all sex
offenders from all areas of the parks. Thus, it does not meet its
burden of employing the least restrictive means possible."1 Therefore,
based on the expressed goals of the town of Woodfin,s2 the ordinance,
due to its overly broad nature, falls short of meeting the standards
required under the strict scrutiny analysis by both failing to target an
appropriately narrow body of banned persons and by failing to
constrain the reach of the ordinance's prohibited actions to the least
restrictive means available.83
III. IMPLICATIONS OF UPHOLDING INFRINGING LEGISLATION
The Woodfin ordinance was enacted on the heels of two prior
sexual offenses committed "in or near" Woodfin town parks. 4 Pieces
of legislation, such as the ordinance in Woodfin and the residency
restrictions for sex offenders that are springing up across the
country, 85 are often "hastily drafted with little debate following a
high-profile crime committed against a minor by a convicted sex
offender."86 Further, sex offenders do not tend to garner much
sympathy from the public at large, 7 and as can be seen in North
Woodfin, Parks & Recreation, formerly available at http://www.woodfinnc.gov/pages/parks.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
79. State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C. 484, 497, 178 S.E.2d 449, 456 (1971). "The familiar
traffic light is . .. an ever present reminder that this segment of liberty is not absolute. It
may be regulated, as to the time and manner of its exercise .. " Id.
80. Standley 1, 186 N.C. App. at 159, 650 S.E.2d at 634 (Geer, J., dissenting).
81. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Pugh v. Rainwater, 557
F.2d 1189, 1195 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978)).
82. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
83. Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492 (citing Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189, 1195 (5th Cir. 1977),
vacated on other grounds, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978)).
84. Standley v. Town of Woodfin (Standley 11), 362 N.C. 328, 330, 661 S.E.2d 728, 729

(2008).
85. See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Validity of Statutes Imposing
Residency Restrictions on Registered Sex Offenders, 25 A.L.R.6th 227, 335 (2007)
(discussing states' legislation that restricts where sex offenders can live "within specified
distances of schools, parks, day-care centers, and other areas").
86. Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions
on Sex Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 101, 122 (2007) (discussing the rush to implement
exclusion zones, within which registered sex offenders are barred from obtaining and
maintaining a residence).
87. See, e.g., Hobson, supra note 16, at 966 (explaining that people tend not to

1992

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

Carolina,88 courts seem to be hesitant to second-guess legislative
efforts that enhance restrictions against sex offenders. Consequently,
the rights of sex offenders are more readily cast aside8 9 with undue
speed and without recognizing the potentially dangerous costs of such
action in the name of protecting one set of citizens.9" Judge Geer,
dissenting from the North Carolina Court of Appeals' majority
opinion in Standley, noted:
Not infrequently, the genesis of widely-held beliefs is fear not
grounded in reality or science, but rather propogated [sic] by
collective terror fueled by television or the internet. We cannot
strip a whole group of people of a fundamental right based not
on their individual behavior, but rather based simply on a
desire to be seen as taking action to respond to the public's
fear-especially when there is only the "belief" that such action
might possibly make the community a little bit safer.9 1
The enactment of Woodfin's broad ordinance banning all
registered sex offenders from the town parks was only the beginning

sympathize with sex offenders who must live within the guidelines of increasingly harsh
restrictions, especially when the public is faced with the influx of media portraying the
horrible crimes committed against children); see also Jack, supra note 66 ("Residents
celebrated enthusiastically, cheering and hugging each other at the end of the Town
Meeting ... as a ban on sex offenders in various public places was passed in a landslide
vote.").
88. See Standley 11, 362 N.C. at 332, 661 S.E.2d at 730.
89. See, e.g., Yung, supra note 86, at 126 ("In 2005, some localities banned sex
offenders from public hurricane shelters, forcing the offenders to seek refuge in local
prisons."); Vitiello, supra note 70, at 681 ("[T]he media recently reported the case of three
offenders forced to live under a highway bridge because they could not find housing that
complied with various legal requirements."); Dan Kane, Hotels Could House Sex
Offenders: Public Would Pay for Temporary Stays, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
June 3, 2008, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/news/crime-safety/story/
1094282.html ("Prison officials say some sex offenders are finding it so hard to find a place
to stay once they are paroled that they eventually give up and serve the remainder of their
sentence behind bars.").
90. See Editorial, Upholding Our Rights, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Sept. 13, 2008, available
at http://www.lvrj.com/opinion/28344524.html ("[I]f the government is allowed to trample
and shred the constitutional rights of even the tiniest, most shunned segment of the
population, how long before authorities decide to take away yours?"); C. Alexander
Evans, Opinion, Protecting Our Kids-Or Assaulting Freedom?, THE RECORD (Bergen
County, N.J.), Aug. 19, 2008, at A8, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/
2008/0814/pO9sOl-coop.html ("When government betrays the Constitution, no matter the
reason, we jeopardize everyone's freedom.").
91. Standley v. Town of Woodfin (Standley 1), 186 N.C. App. 134, 164-65, 650 S.E.2d
618, 638 (2007) (Geer, J., dissenting); see also Yung, supra note 86, at 105 ("By casting out
sex offenders in response to a political environment charged with hysteria and fear, we are
in danger of undermining the basic principles of our democratic government.").
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of this type of legislation in North Carolina.' While a few other
localities followed suit before the Standley decision was finalized, 93
there has been a marked increase in the number of North Carolina
towns that have passed similar legislation since the Supreme Court of
North Carolina upheld the constitutionality of such legislation in June
2008. 9' Unfortunately, some communities have not merely instituted
bans limiting access to parks, but have enacted ordinances that
expand the reach of the bans to include golf courses, nature centers,
and community centers. 95 Further, while North Carolina may claim
some of the first enactments of park bans and the like, it no longer
stands alone in the United States.96 For example, the town of
Windsor Locks, Connecticut, recently passed an ordinance banning a
broadly defined group of registered sex offenders 97 from an extensive
number of public spaces by creating "Child Safety Zones."9 " Like in
Woodfin, the Windsor Locks ordinance makes it "unlawful for a sex
offender to be present in any Child Safety Zone"9 9 while including no

92. The town of Woodfin touted the park ban ordinance as the first of its kind in the
United States, having devoted an entire section of the town's former Website to its
importance. Town of Woodfin, Keeping You Safe: Registered Sex Offenders Are
Prohibited from Entering Any Park or Recreational Facility of the Town of Woodfin,
formerly available at http://www.woodfin-nc.gov/pages/parks.html (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
93. See, e.g., Bethea, supra note 67 (indicating that Morganton, North Carolina,
passed a park ban for sex offenders in January of 2008).
94. See id. (reporting that, following Morganton and Woodfin, Mecklenburg County
finalized efforts to ban sex offenders from parks and recreational facilities); Vicky
Eckenrode, New Hanover Commissioners Vote to Ban Sex Offenders from Parks, STARNEWS (Wilmington, N.C.), Sept. 3, 2008, available at http://www.starnewsonline.com/
article/20080903IARTICLES/809030326 (describing the enactment of a local park ban
against registered sex offenders as "similar" to the bans already in place in Wilmington
and Pender County).
95. See Bethea, supra note 67 ("The ordinance would apply not only to community
parks, but facilities such as golf courses, nature centers and the Mecklenburg County
Aquatic Center.").
96. See Doe v. Town of Plainfield, 893 N.E.2d 1124, 1132 n.8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
The Court of Appeals of Indiana, citing the Supreme Court of North Carolina's decision
in Standley H, found constitutional a town ordinance that broadly banned sex offenders
from parks. Id.
97. See WINDSOR LOCKS, CONN., TOWN ORDINANCES § 2(a)(ii)(a) (2008), available
at http://www.windsorlocksct.org/page.php?pid=355 (defining the banned group to include
those people who have committed sexual offenses against either children or adults, even
though the express purpose of the ordinance is to protect children specifically).
98. See id. § 2(a)(i)(a) (banning sex offenders from any number of town-owned public
places including "[a] park, school, library, playground, recreation center, bathing beach,
swimming pool .... gymnasium, sports field, or sports facility").
99. Id. § 2(b) (emphasis added).
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reference to specifically prohibited activities, thus infringing on the
right of access implicit in the fundamental right to intrastate travel.1°°
Unless and until the courts, both in North Carolina and
elsewhere, decide to reexamine the constitutional issues surrounding
these and other similar bans, the prevalence and level of intrusiveness
of such bans are likely to increase. In the meantime, there exists a
potential danger that towns may use the motive of protecting children
as a way to legislate certain groups of "undesirable" people, be they
sex offenders or others, out of their communities completely.10 1 Judge
Geer articulated this concern in her court of appeals dissent: "Will
municipalities next be allowed to bar other groups feared at times by
the public-such as the mentally ill or handicapped, the homeless,
gays, or people of middle eastern descent-because of the possibility
that some individual members ... might in the future engage in
unlawful conduct?' 1 2
Rather than creating broad, sweeping
legislation meant to protect members of the public from future acts of
prior sex offenders, "[a]ny long-term solution to sexual violence
needs to include a variety of policies tailored to individual
offenders."'0 3
CONCLUSION

While the threat of sexually based offenses against fellow
citizens, especially children, resonates as a concern to be taken
seriously across the country, efforts to minimize these threats should
not compromise constitutional rights. The burden falls on both
legislatures and courts to design and uphold laws that consider the
restrictions necessary to protect local citizens in light of the
fundamental constitutional protections granted to all citizens."' In
North Carolina, the right to intrastate travel is one fundamental right
requiring such consideration. Pursuant to the findings of the Johnson
100. See supra Part I.A.
101. See, e.g., Yung, supra note 86, at 105 (discussing the potential long-term

implications of residency "exclusion zones" and noting that the continuation of the current
trend of exclusion legislation could make legally possible "the ability to zone out any

group of undesirables in America").
102. Standley v. Town of Woodfin (Standley 1) 186 N.C. App. 134,165, 650 S.E.2d 618,
638 (2007) (Geer, J., dissenting).
103. Yung, supra note 86, at 159 (emphasis added) (discussing the need for government

actions toward sex offenders, both in the punishment stages and in the post-release stages,
that focus on finding solutions based more on individual tendencies as well as
implementation of stronger efforts to rehabilitate, rather than isolate, the offenders).
104. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 2002 FED App. 0332P,

33, 310 F.3d 484,

505 (6th Cir.) (striking down as unconstitutional a law which prohibited certain groups of
people from accessing a certain area of the city).
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court, the right to intrastate travel encompasses the right to access
public spaces like parks, °5 and the infringement of such a right
requires a strict scrutiny analysis to determine whether the infringing
legislation is narrowly tailored to meet the desired end. 0 6
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of North Carolina failed to
use such an analysis. By misinterpreting the Johnson decision-its
only source of constitutional precedent-the Standley court permitted
Woodfin's ordinance, overbroad in every respect, to thwart the
fundamental right to intrastate travel of an entire group of citizens.
While intending to protect children from sexual offenses, the
Woodfin ordinance imposes an outright prohibition on all registered
sex offenders from entering public parks, regardless of whether their
past offenses involved children, regardless of their recidivist
tendencies, and regardless of their basic capacity to commit such an
10 7
act in the future.
Mr. Standley, a man who could not care for himself due to a
debilitating injury, a man who needed constant assistance and
supervision when away from home,10 8 was lumped into a broad
category of individuals perceived to be a threat and was thus denied,
along with others like him, his constitutional right to intrastate travel
within his community. If courts continue to allow legislation like that
in Woodfin to infringe on constitutional rights without narrowly
tailoring the application to meet a compelling governmental interest,
Mr. Standley's situation may become all too familiar to more and
more citizens, and the constitutional rights of all citizens will continue
to diminish.
EMILY E. REARDON

105. See id., 16, 310 F.3d at 495 (holding that the right to intrastate travel includes
"the right to travel locally through public spaces").
106. See cases cited supra notes 40-44.
107. See Standley 1,186 N.C. App. at 166, 650 S.E.2d at 639 (Geer, J., dissenting).
108. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.

